Architectural style is a medium for the promotion of cultural identities and cohesion. South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation nations provide a prism through which all forms of vernacular architecture can be viewed. This study is presented through the lens of the soul of the eye coupled with the power of technological probing. This synthesis affords a most appealing and lyrical exploration of the course of the development of cities within the SAARC nations. It showcases research results combining the above (...) stated synergy—starting from some of SAARC’s sophisticated historic cultures, cultures that ebbed and flowed along its shores and valleys. This paper shall touch upon unique cultural roots stretching back to the Dravidian civilization that flourished over 3500 years ago and also look at the grouping of houses within the Indus Valley Civilization in Lothal and the Sarasvati Valley Civilization in Kalibangan. The sensitivity underlying SAARC architecture and its traditions are seen in many communal settlements, profoundly so in the Indian subcontinent and in Sri Lanka. The paper shall showcase two specific, but nevertheless, distinct styles of communal functioning within unique architectural strongholds in the ancient Ratnagiri University in Odisha, India, and also touch upon a unique blend of styles of landscape architecture in Sri Lanka. The overarching emphasis of this study is that throughout SAARC’s history, architecture has been creatively adopted to the need of its users and the characteristics of its climate and location. It has always fulfilled the needs and nourished the spirit of its people, promoting cultural cohesion even today. In this context, it is interesting to explore traditional techniques of vernacular architecture in houses in Andhra, Tamil Nadu and Kerala. The common thread linking mass housing in Lothal, Kalibangan, Anuradhapura and Ratnagiri about 2 millennia ago, with present day housing patterns, is in the application of sustainable building practices using intelligent building forms, fabric and orientation. This paper explores this commonality from a modern perspective using CFD. As the SAARC countries still struggle to get a fuller understanding of their unique ecology and the complexity of their diverse cultures, revisiting the architectural legacy of their indigenous societies might prove insightful. The need for this revisit becomes even more relevant in the wake of the Paris Agreement and more recently the Kigali Agreement. The discourse on providing indoor thermal comfort to the SAARC people cannot be decoupled from the climate change story—heating, ventilation and cooling consume a large amount of energy and have a deep underlying link with the targets set at Paris and Kigali. The onus will be on a large number of stakeholders to meet these targets—engineers, architects, manufacturers, policy-makers, researchers and consumers. This paper aims at reminding the stakeholders of the richness and the usefulness of their vernacular architecture in upholding the ideal of sustainability. (shrink)

Reflecting on the knowledge of God in the Old and the New Covenant offers us anew way to address the theological status of the philosophical proofs for theexistence of God. In the treatise De Deo Uno of the Summa, Aquinas discusseshow the intellect experiences its natural capacity to know God. The “five ways”are inseparable from one another. In the prologue to the Lectura on Saint John,Aquinas‟s last Gospel commentary, the Doctor Angelicus praises the depth of theevangelist‟s contemplation by comparison with (...) pagan philosophical knowledgeof God, relating it to Isaiah‟s vision of God in the Temple in Jerusalem .“I saw the Lord on an elevated throne” . . . . Saint John‟s vision focuseson the authority and power of the Word: “I saw the Lord,” on hiseternity: “the Lord was seated;” on the excellence and nobility of hisnature: “I saw the Lord seated on a throne;” on his incomprehensibletruth: “an elevated throne.”2Bringing to light the unity of the knowledge of God in the Old and the NewCovenant, Aquinas continues: “It is through these ideas that the ancientphilosophies rose to knowledge of God.” Thus pagan philosophies becomeconnected with the Evangelist and with the Prophets. Indeed one can recognize inthe fourfold articulation of the contemplation of the Prophet and the Evangelistthe central axis of the “four ways” by which “several philosophies arrived atknowledge of God;” God as the intelligence governing nature ; as theunchangeable principle of all motion ; as supreme cause of being; as intelligence and infinite truth . Aquinas briefly developseach of these ways and concludes with a line of Scripture taken from Isaiah, apsalm, or the New Testament. He then adds: “Such was the contemplation of John who because he had seen the Word in its regulatory authority, its eternity,its excellence, and its incomprehensibility, wanted in his Gospel to transmit to ussomething about his contemplation.”3Here, unlike in the commentary on Hebrews 11: 6,4where Aquinasaccents the difference between philosophical knowledge of God and faith,Aquinas emphasizes the unity of the motion of the intellect seeking God, whetherit is philosophical or theological. These two ways of emphasis do not contradicteach other. The natural knowledge which a human being has of God receivesconfirmation and fulfilment in the revelation given to the prophets and to theapostles in the Old and the New Covenant. The fulfilment of the knowledge ofGod by philosophers transforms their “proofs” of God‟s existence by witnessingto the motion by which the human intellect is naturally drawn toward God itscreator. For natural knowledge of God, the intellect leads itself to the conclusions and, in a certain way, “walks forward” to encounter faith. Divine revelation transforms the “proofs” into “ways” toHim, who in reality manifests Himself by drawing to Himself the intellectthrough the infinite action by which he creates it. This natural motion is soimportant for Aquinas that in the prologue he suggests that the readers of hisbiblical commentary verify it for themselves. May we not consider that the “fiveways” of Question 2 of the Summa Theologica, the hinge between the definitionof sacra doctrina and the treatise De Deo Uno, play a similar role of theologicalself-verification? (shrink)

I have spent more than thirty years struggling with Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit; and I am absolutely weary of wrestling with the angel I found in it. So when I was pressed to contribute to the silver anniversary issue of The Owl I decided to take the easy way, and to send in an essay on the Phenomenology and the Logic that is literally the last word from the two-volume commentary that will be published as Hegel’s Ladder. Far from being (...) complete the “Hegel Renaissance” is still only in its adolescence. But my part in it is now over. Laus Deo. (shrink)

After a period during which the theological categories of sin and forgiveness were ignored or trivialized, presently these notions are being rediscovered. What could their impact be on bioethics, either in the narrow sense of medical ethics, or in the more encompassing sense of the ethics of the life sciences? This essay begins with describing the processes of transcending and ethitization, which gave rise to the biblical notion of sin. It portrays the theological foundation of sin in terms of a (...) twofold refusal of proper relations to God and other humans. Through the practise of confession in the face of God (coram deo), sin is placed into a horizon of hope for forgiveness and reconciliation. The heuristic and hermeneutical significance of these categories results from their introducing a “surplus value,” which transcends biological and ethical considerations. This additional dimension is illustrated in view of care (cura) for the injured, and in view of individual as well as collective willingness to forgive. (shrink)

We aim to compile some means for a rational reconstruction of a named part of the start-over of Baruch (Benedictus) de Spinoza's metaphysics in 'de deo' (which is 'pars prima' of the 'ethica, ordine geometrico demonstrata' ) in terms of 1st order model theory. In so far, as our approach will be judged successful, it may, besides providing some help in understanding Spinoza, also contribute to the discussion of some or other philosophical evergreen, e.g. 'ontological commitment'. For this text we (...) assume the reader familiar with 'de deo' as well as with some basic concepts and results of 1st order model theory. Before we start reconstruction, we will first revisit shortly the concept of 'attributum' (definitio IV) in it's setting in 'de deo' , next scan for formalizable aspects of 'in suo genere finita' ('de deo', definitio II), subsequently list the model theoretic constructs we will make use of. Then we begin reconstruction by stating "coordinative definitions" for the notions of 'attribute (of a substance)', 'modus (as conceived via an attribute)' and 'substance (as conceived via an attribute)', reasoning shortly for each of them. The "coordinative definitions", we will arrive at, must not be understood as literal translations of Spinoza's concepts - of course, there can't be such a thing as a literal translation - they are meant as formal analoga of these concepts, mapping some logical structure. But even with this caveat they may seem strange to the reader at this stage of discussion. Additional justification for them then should be found in our endeavour, to map some argumentation of Spinoza's proofs of some of his propositions from this starting point. -/- [ Version 1 of this paper originated from 2020-03-14. This is version 2 from 2021-09-12 with some readability amendments. ]. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Ideas 61.4 (2000) 577-593 [Access article in PDF] Machina Ex Deo: William Harvey and the Meaning of Instrument Don Bates Introduction Since our clocks do consistently disclose each hour of the day and night--do they not seem to partake of another body (beyond the elements), and that more divine? But if, under the dominion and management of [our human] Art, such splendid things are (...) daily achieved beyond the powers of the objects themselves,... And if, in serving men they carry out such things as are to be marvelled at, what I ask, may we expect from them when they be instruments in the hand of God? These words come near the end of William Harvey's De generatione animalium. 1 As he does often in this work, he is arguing that it is possible for a material object to behave supra vires elementorum, i.e., in a manner that exceeds what can be explained merely from the qualities of the elements from which it is made. In fact, just before this, he argues that human craftsmanship enables the elements of air and water to make ships sail in opposite directions, fire to do one sort of thing in the kitchen, another in the shops of metal-workers, including the production of iron, which in its turn peacefully tills the soil or besieges the town in war. So if even human Art is capable of making something as wonderful as a clock out of the elements, how much more might God be able to do with them? [End Page 577]Not only is it entirely conceivable that the (divinely) artful manipulation of these same elements can account for the wonders of God's nature--such as the generation of a chick out of an egg--there is also no need to infer the existence of additional entities such as faculties, qualities, agents, and the like. All that is needed is the concept of "instrument." Today such things as his appeal to a clock, his reference to "art," and the word "instrument" itself, are liable to arouse in our minds a fairly mechanical sort of image. Therefore, we need to put this idea in its intellectual context, by looking at where Harvey's notion of instrument is coming from.First, our much more mechanical world view was just coming into being as Harvey (1578-1657) wrote these words. Although the philosophy of his younger contemporary, René Descartes (1596-1650) was not yet in full bloom (he died a year before Harvey's book appeared), Cartesianism was certainly on the explanatory horizon, 2 as was the work of another contemporary and contributor to the "new philosophy," Pierre Gassendi (1592-1655). 3 And, of course, Harvey had certainly known Francis Bacon (1561-1626). 4 Nevertheless, Harvey was a devout Aristotelian who was adamantly opposed to the efforts of these contemporaries to replace Aristotle. 5 Moreover, it was from the Aristotelian tradition, not from the new mechanics, that Harvey had derived the concept of instrument.If, broadly speaking, the "new philosophy" was about a universe that was built like a clock, then the "old" natural philosophies, whether dominated by Platonism, Aristotelianism, Christian theology, or some combination, were about a universe that was socially constructed. 6 Not only was man at the center, to a large extent the workings of the universe were envisioned in terms of social experience. The regularity, predictability, harmony, and wonder of natural phenomena seemed best explained in the language of reason, moral values, motives, responsibilities, hierarchies, laws (in the social sense), and the like, explanatory resources that, in the late ancient and medieval intellectual cultures of Europe, far outweighed either those that appealed to the passively material and the mechanical, or to the random and the chance.But very central to that social model of nature was the concept of instrument, which gave to it something of a mechanical twist. To see how this was so, we need to go back temporarily to the works of Aristotle, the influence of... (shrink)

“Sacra à Deo in corde discenda, natura ex natura.” Johann Christian Senckenberg's Observationes as a Medico-Theological Writing Method. In his early diaries, the pietist physician Johann Christian Senckenberg has taken down large amounts of observation data which mostly concentrated on his own body and soul. Earlier research has mistaken his diligent self-observation for hypochondria and unworldliness, especially since the author had never endeavoured to analyze and publish his work. The article shows that both his writing practice and his reluctance to (...) process and share its results are due to his deeply religious and firmly anti-rationalist conviction. The main purpose of his journal keeping was the attainment of religious self-knowledge and professional self-perfection. Scientific publications he considered to be hypothetical and dogmatic, be it in theology or medicine; moreover, their authors were often enough driven by their self-love and desire for fame. In his eyes, the only godly way of knowledge acquisition was the humble, diligent and minute study of divine creation according to the Hippocratic method. The most immediate and reliable way of achieving true wisdom, however, was the observation of God's work within one's own body and mind, which were subject to the effects of God's grace and punishment as well as to atmospheric, environmental and dietetic circumstances. (shrink)

The paper presents the theological and philosophical category of Deus absconditus and shows it in the perspective of Nicholas of Cusa’s ideas contained in his dialogue De Deo Abscondito. The hidden God is the totally transcendent God that is beyond creation both ontologically and logically. Deus absconditus is God that cannot be the object of rational cognition and positive knowledge, hence the only way to acquire any knowledge of him is the method of negative theology. Therefore, the hidden God is (...) the subject of mystical epistemology. Cusanus’s Deus absconditus is also called Truth and as such he is not only incomprehensible, but also incommunicable. God’s transcendence, rational unintelligibility and inexpressibility are the aspects which the considerations presented in this paper build on. (shrink)

The idea that God creates out of Himself seems quite attractive. Many find great appeal in holding that a temporally finite universe must have a cause, but I think there’s also great appeal in holding that there’s pre-existent stuff out of which that universe is created—and what could that stuff be but part of God? Though attractive, the idea of creation ex deo hasn’t been taken seriously by theistic philosophers. Perhaps this is because it seems too vague—‘could anything enlightening be (...) said about what those parts are?’—or objectionable—‘wouldn’t creating out of those parts lessen or destroy God?’ Drawing from Stephen Kosslyn and Michael Tye’s work on the ontology of mental images, I respond to the above questions by developing a theory on which God creates the universe out of His mental imagery. (shrink)

This little volume, by the Director of the Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies at the University of California is a splendid work. Lynn White, who considers himself a Christian and a humanist, has written an important book linking together cultural changes in the modern world with those events in earlier periods which precipitated the changes. His major thesis is that the alienation of the humanist from technology is unfortunate, and that a rapprochement between the two is possible if one (...) reads history accurately. Technology developed, White argues, in the fertile cultural and intellectual soul of the Christian middle ages. It was the Christian view of reality that allowed man to take nature seriously and to permit him to think in terms of measuring and analyzing it. The Christian saw the world as a manifestation of the working of the mind of God, and his science was an attempt to decipher God's thought by exploring the nature of his handiwork. The technological innovations of the Middle Ages were possible because of the Christian's conviction that God had given man power and dominion over all creation: "The men who worshiped the Virgin also developed water wheels to perform all kinds of tasks that previously had been done by hand." To medieval man, the machine came from God. What White seems to be saying is that the Christian view of reality is one which produces a full-blown humanism, one in which man is free to develop his natural capacities, in a world which has been created by God for man to enjoy and in which man can best fulfill himself as a human. "Christianity, in absolute contrast to ancient paganism and Asia's religions, not only established a dualism of man and nature but insisted that it is God's will that man exploit nature for his proper ends."--W. A. J. (shrink)

Israel Gottlieb Canz’ im Jahre 1742 erschienene Theologia naturalis thetico-polemica ist die erste von drei Abhandlungen dieses Autors über natürliche Theologie. Diese ist bei ihm als eine Art Vorbereitung für die „theologia sublimior“ (die geoffenbarte Theologie) zu verstehen. Die Theologia naturalis hat bei Canz als eine theologia thetica eine darlegende und beweisende Funktion. Dahinter steht eine programmatische These, nämlich dass sie als alleinige Erlöserin des Menschen von seinen Sünden nicht ausreicht. Vielmehr soll durch sie die Notwendigkeit des Weges zur Versöhnung (...) aufgezeigt werden; den Weg selber zu erforschen steht ihr nicht zu. Canz’ natürliche Theologie ist auch eine theologia polemica. Gleich in der Praefatio präzisiert der Verfasser, dass er die Systeme der Gegner, ihre Argumente usw. darlegen und sie analysieren und diskutieren werde. Dies erfolgt aber im Hinblick auf den eigenen Diskurs bzw. im Ausgang von diesem, der sich in Konformität mit der geoffenbarten Theologie weiß. Canz gehört zur ersten Generation „Wolffscher Theologen“, bewahrt sich aber eine gewisse Unabhängigkeit gegenüber Topoi der Wolffschen Philosophie und geht durchaus eigene Wege. Dies im Einzelnen nachzuweisen, gehört zu den zahlreichen Forschungsdesideraten im Hinblick auf die Philosophie des 18. Jahrhunderts. Israel Gottlieb Canz’s Theologia naturalis thetico-polemica, published in 1742 is the first of three works by this author on natural theology, which in his case should be understood as a kind of preparation for the ‘theologia sublimior’ (revealed theology). In Canz’s work, theologia naturalis has the expository and substantiating function of a theologia thetica. Behind this stands a programmatic thesis, namely that theology alone is not sufficient to redeem mankind from its sins. Instead, the necessity of a path to reconciliation must be demonstrated; it is not the role of theology itself to seek that path. Canz’s natural theology is also a theologia polemica. In the preface the author states that he will explain, analyse and discuss his opponents’ systems, arguments etc. However, he does this with reference to his own discourse, or rather taking that discourse, which is recognised as conforming with revealed theology, as a starting point. Canz belongs to the first generation of ‘Wolffian theologians’, but retains a certain independence from the topoi of Wolffian philosophy and follows paths which are entirely his own. A detailed examination of these is one of the many desiderata for researchers engaging with the philosophy of the 18th century. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:American Journal of Philology 122.3 (2001) 429-432 [Access article in PDF] John Miles Foley. Homer's Traditional Art. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999. xviii + 363 pp. Bibl., indexes. Cloth, $48.50. With Homer's Traditional Art, which may well prove his most popular book, Foley attempts a synthesis of his theory of traditional oral aesthetics, which has been under construction for a decade, since Traditional Oral Epic (Berkeley 1990) (...) and Immanent Art (Bloomington 1991). Because substantial passages in the book have lived past lives, and the fresh material adapts arguments made elsewhere, we are looking here for a statement that gives coherence and new force to a program of study; one that cultivates, rather than breaks, new theoretical ground. That this is Foley's aim is confirmed by a description of his audience: "a wide spectrum of readers, from the advanced undergraduate to the professional scholar" (xv), representing "the greatest number and variety of readers" possible (317 n. 1). Foley offers three main justifications for this new synthesis. First is the doctrine of the Homeric sêma (a key sign open to interpretation), which Foley ingeniously cites as evidence for a Greek concept similar to that of the South Slavic rec=, or "word." This he takes from Parry's interviews with Yugoslav epic singers in which they proclaim the term's application to various levels of traditional discourse, from the formula to the proverb to larger narrative patterns. The second--if I read the book's stylistic motives correctly--is a new "Homeric" technique in scholarly prose. Homer's Traditonal Art is a rhetorical juggernaut that creates inevitable momentum by frequently signaling the progress of Foley's argument, often rewording parts of the theory, and, as if to demonstrate in prose the referential power of Homer's "traditional register" of speech, offering some sêmata of his own (5-7): six "proverbs" of his own coining that encapsulate the main findings of his previous studies (e.g., "Oral tradition works like language, only more so"). These recur steadily throughout, often in closing paragraphs or summing up evidence, and are lightly varied according to context, but always point back to larger critical vistas. Third is the début of the apparatus fabulosus, or running cues to the "traditional referentiality" of a passage; here some lines from Odyssey 23 (reproduced 254-55; cf. the similar printing of the Old English poem Deor, 275). This is an attempt to approximate an "original" experience of a traditional text in performance, though Foley has no illusions about its perfection. Again, the effort requires that he supply conventions of his own (introduced in chapter 7), which he promises to refine for future "editions" on traditional principles.The book is laid out in four large sections, subdivided into an introduction, eight main chapters, an afterword on Old English poetics, two appendices, a large [End Page 429] apparatus of notes, and a rich bibliography (with few serious omissions, such as Manetti's Theories of the Sign in Classical Antiquity [Bloomington 1993]), a good general index (including scholars cited), and index locorum. If this does not sound like a work for a general readership, that is because Foley has expressly sought to divide his voice in two: the main discussion was to be plainly worded and clearly laid out; the scholarly audience to be addressed in the notes. On the whole, this technique works well, only occasionally failing one side or the other. The editors made the strange and regrettable decision of omitting non-Greek works from the index locorum, so that you have to check all entries in the general index for discussions of key passages in Beowulf, Deor, the many recorded South Slavic epics discussed, and so on. Greek traditional phrases are indexed in translation, so that for a discussion of (e.g.) chlôron deos, you need to know how Foley happens to translate it. The Pennsylvania State University Press has atoned for such lapses by producing a handsome volume, printed on good paper and bound in signatures with linen thread, a delight to hold. (Teachers will want... (shrink)

The author?s approach is based on three premises: 1. that Gajo Petrovic?s Praxis was an outstanding phenomenon in Croatian, Yugoslav and European culture, a challenge of freedom in a repressive society; 2. that there has never been such a thing as "Praxis group", "philosophers of practice" or "Praxis philosophers" with a unified philosophical and socio-theoretical orientation; and 3. that political and ideological attacks on Praxis were part of the repressive system that targeted every instance of cultural and scientific dissent. The (...) political leadership of Tito?s regime, its ideological and propaganda apparatus systematically disseminated allegations, denunciations and accusations against Praxis and Gajo Petrovic. The same style has survived through radical historical changes from the appearance of Praxis until today. The attackers have often been the same persons, with the difference that in earlier times they denounced Praxis and Gajo Petrovic as enemies of "socialism" and the "socialist self-management system", and in the changed political fashion as "servants" of Tito?s authoritarian rule. The fate of Praxis in the former regime has been triumphantly interpreted as a "family quarrel". This paper attempts a sociological analysis of the political destiny of Praxis. The analysis is essentially determined not by old and new political and ideological questionings of Praxis, but by Gajo Petrovic?s fundamental belief that there is no freedom without the human or humanity without freedom.. Osnovu autorovog pristupa cine tri stava: 1. da je Praxis Gaje Petrovica bio izuzetna pojava u hrvatskoj, jugoslovenskoj i evropskoj kulturi, izazov slobode u drustvu represije; 2. da ne postoji tako nesto kao "praxis-grupa", "filozofi prakse" ili "praxis filozofi" koji bi imali jedinstvenu filozofsku ili drustveno-teorijsku orijentaciju; 3. da su politicka i ideoloska osporavanja Praxisa bila deo represivnog sistema kojem je bilo podvrgnuto svako neistomisljenistvo u kulturi i nauci. Politicki vrh Titovog rezima, njegov ideoloski i propagandni aparat sistematski su sirili insinuacije, denuncijacije i optuzbe o Praxisu i Gaji Petrovicu, da bi taj manir u bitno promenjenim istorijskim okolnostima, trajao od pojave Praxisa do danasnjeg dana. Cesto su i akteri napada bile iste osobe, samo sto su nekada osporavali Praxis i Gaju Petrovica kao neprijatelje "socijalizma" i "sistema socijalistickog samoupravljanja", a u promenjenoj politickoj modi kao "sluge" Titove autoritarne vladavine. Sudbinu Praxisa u prethodnom rezimu slavodobitno su tumacili kao "obracun u obitelji". Rad je pokusaj socioloske analize politicke sudbine Praxisa, koju ce bitno odrediti temeljno uverenje Gaje Petrovica da nema slobode bez coveka ni ljudskosti bez slobode, a ne stara i nova politicka i ideoloska osporavanja Praxisa.. (shrink)

Author considering, appearing and existing modern idea about university like one of the most important institution of knowledge which is arise in modern epoch. In this work particular attention will be initiated on considered different ideas and conception university which were before so-called Himbolt?s idea of university which has global disposition and which is in the last two centuries regardless on period of crisis, had dominant position in contemporary high school education.. The second part of work is consecrated on analysis (...) constitute the first Serbian university. In this part of work will be analyze different treatise and projects of university which are during 19. and on the beginning of 20. century arise in circle of Serbian intellectual elite in which are essentially influence at form of institutionally profile the first Serbian university. The third part of work surround there different phase of develop on university and university education in Serbia in XX and on the beginning of XXI century. The first phase present the time between two war; the second phase is consecrate the time of and the third phase consecrate the last decade of XX and the first decade of XXI century in which are tempestuous changes in society announce new searching and fundamental over questioning the state in our high school institution with primary target that theirs work coordinate with standard of European universities and that way accomplish theirs integration in net of European universities. Autor razmatra uslove nastanka srednjovekovnog univerziteta, shvacenog kao korporacije fakulteta, i govori o filozofskim idejama koje su uticale na stvaranje i sirenje moderne ideje univerziteta, sigurno jedne od najznacajnijih institucija znanja koja je nastala u modernoj epohi. U ovom radu posebna paznja bice posvecena razmatranju razlicitih filozofskih ideja univerziteta koje su prethodile stvaranju tzv. Humboltove ideje univerziteta koja je u poslednja dva veka, bez obzira na periode krize, imala u savremenom visokom skolstvu dominantnu poziciju. Drugi deo rada posvecen je razmatranju procesa konstituisanja prvog srpskog univerziteta. U ovom delu rada bice analizirane razlicite rasprave i projekti univerziteta koji su tokom 19. i pocetkom 20. veka nastali u krugovima srpske intelektualne elite i koji su bitno uticali na institucionalni karakter i obrazovni profil prvog srpskog univerziteta. Treci deo rada obuhvata razmatranje cetiri razlicite faze razvitka modernog univerziteta i univerzitetske nastave u Srbiji u XX veku. Prvu fazu cini period od osnivanja Beogradskog univerziteta do pocetka Prvog svetskog rata. Druga faza je posvecena razmatranju univerzitetskog obrazovanja u medjuratnom periodu, a treca i cetvrta faza obuhvataju analizu razvitka i funkcionisanja univerziteta u doba komunizma i pocetak tranzicije. Burne promene u nasem drustvu devedesetih godina XX veka, najavile su nova traganja i temeljna preispitivanja stanja na nasim visokoskolskim institucijama s osnovnim ciljem da se njihov nacin i program rada uskladi sa savremenim evropskim univerzitetskim standardima i na taj nacin pripremi njihovo integrisanje u mrezu evropskih univerziteta. (shrink)

The impermanence of human affairs is a major theme in Spinoza’s discussions of political histories, and from our present-day perspective it is both intriguing and ironic to see how this very theme has played out in the evolving fate of Spinoza’s association with atheism. While Spinoza’s contemporaries charged him with atheism in order to impugn his philosophy (and sometimes his character), in our times many lay readers and some scholars portray Spinoza as an atheist in order to commemorate his role (...) as a founder of modern secularism. In this paper, I will argue that Spinoza deserves neither vilification nor praise for being an atheist, for the simple reason that he was not one (unless one employs the term ‘atheism’ in a very peculiar sense). I have chosen the current topic as my contribution to a volume focused on the TTP, the Ethics, and their interrelations because it is precisely these two books which brought about the common reactionary accusation of atheism by Spinoza’s contemporaries. Addressing Spinoza’s 1663 book, Descartes’ Principles of Philosophy, Bayle writes: “Spinoza appears as orthodox in that book about the nature of God.” As we shall shortly see, Descartes too was accused of atheism by some of his contemporaries (though not so by Bayle). The latter designates his target quite explicitly: “[Spinoza’s] Tractatus Theologico Politicus, printed in Amsterdam, in the year 1670, is a pernicious and execrable book which contains all the seeds of the Atheism he plainly discovered in his Opera Posthuma.” François Lamy, in his 1696 Le nouvel athéisme renversé, also focused on the Ethics and the TTP in his attack on Spinoza’s atheism. Bayle’s reference to the Opera Posthuma is ostensibly targeting the Ethics at least primarily, if not uniquely. Even the most suspicious and distrustful mind would have to labor hard in order to find atheism in the Hebrew Grammar, or even in the Tractatus Politicus where Spinoza argues that it is not within the power, and hence right, of the commonwealth to induce people to adopt utterly absurd beliefs, such as “that the whole is greater than its part or that God does not exist.” The TTP and the Ethics are the works where Spinoza launches his merciless attack on anthropocentric thinking and anthropomorphic religion. Spinoza’s panentheism (“quicquid est, in Deo est”) constitutes the metaphysical foundation of the Ethics, and it is repeatedly and clearly alluded to in the TTP. Since it is these two elements – (1) Spinoza’s open assertions of panentheism and (2) his critique of andromorphic conceptions of God – which are the historical grounds for the atheism charge, it seems natural that the merit of this charge should be decided primarily by examination of these two foundational works. I will proceed in the following manner. In the first part of the paper, we will make our first acquaintance with the imputation of atheism by Spinoza’s contemporaries and Spinoza’s response to the charge (or lack thereof). In the second part, I discuss three broad strategies, or hermeneutic avenues, that have been pursued to impute atheism to Spinoza. The first of the three was dominant in Spinoza’s time, while the latter two were employed more recently. These strategies are not mutually exclusive and we can find occasionally various combinations of different shades of these three strategies. In this part, I will also raise some preliminary questions about the cogency of the hermeneutics employed by each strategy. In the third and fourth parts of the paper, I will discuss a small selection of key texts from the Ethics and the TTP, respectively, and argue that the atheist readings fail to make sense of these key passages (unless one adopts an extreme hermeneutics of suspicion which could allegedly find any view harbored in any text). Let me stress that this selection of passages is far from comprehensive, and that dozens of other passages can be adduced to establish the very same point. I hope by the end of the fourth part to convince the reader of the deep problems besetting the atheist readings. In the fifth and last part, I show that both panentheism and the critique of anthropomorphic religion and anthropomorphic conceptions of providence were quite common within rabbinic discourse. Thus, I will argue that if we are not in the business of announcing that both Maimonides and the Kabbalists were atheists, we should avoid the same imputation to Spinoza. Underlying my argument in this final part is the claim that at least some perceptions of Spinoza as an atheist are instances of what could be termed conceptual colonialism, i.e. the enforcement of the categories of a hegemonic culture (in this case, Western Christianity ) on minority cultures (in the current case, rabbinic Judaism). To be clear, this attitude need not be motivated by ill intentions or racism. It is always tempting and easy to explain the unfamiliar through the familiar, but conceptual stagnation and insistence on imposing the categories of the familiar on other cultures may quickly lead to deep distortion and blindness, despite one’s best intentions. Unless one is exceedingly careful to avoid the – completely natural – temptation to impose one’s own categories on a foreign culture (and to look for the coin only under the street light), one is likely to end up with distorted conceptions of the relevant alien culture, despite one’s best intentions. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:To Paul Lachance, ioculator Domini1. IntroductionWith the expression “inner experience” we refer to a complex linguistic and philosophical problem which is present even in the most recent theology. If, in general, this concept expresses the experience of something which is perceived by an individual in the absence of external stimulus or observable sensations, in Christian and mystical tradition it indicates more precisely the action and the transformation which God (...) arouses in the inner conscience. I propose investigating the specific way the Provençal Franciscan Pierre de Jean Olieu used this concept and presented it, both philosophically and theologically, in a small collection of writings which critical tradition has defined in various ways, but which I continue defining, with a term which maintains a Franciscan suggestion, as opuscula.1 These short devotional texts were written by Olieu and his followers in both Provençal and in Latin, and explicitly addressed the Beguins of the so-called “poverty houses,” as well as the laity which congregated around the Franciscan Order.2 Unlike the prayers and treatises concerning prayer by Olieu, these texts are not completely set but are conceived and written as models of continuous meditation on the part of the reader.3 In view of the critique I am editing, I here furnish a list of these texts, with the aim of updating the incomplete lists complied by Efrem Bettoni4 and Antonio Ciceri:5Cavalier armat Exercens se sacris orationibus et meditationibus Informatio Petri Ioannis De 14 gradibus amoris gratiosi 12De [12/10] gradibus humilitatis 13Grases de vera penitentia 14Modus quomodo quilibet potest referre gratias Deo de Beneficiis ab eo receptis Brevis monitio ad amorem Dei obtinendum 17Remedia contra temptationes spirituales De 7 sentimentis Christi Jhesu 20 Tractatus de 7 tentationibus 21Tractatulus de fugiendis, desiderandis, meditandis 22This approach is particularly interesting, because it is my conviction that, in these texts the author focuses on the paths and transformations of conscience, on the inter-communication of them and on the potential of repeating and recreating, autonomously, an uninterrupted process of spiritual transformation and strengthening. In this sense, as we will see, the concept of “inner experience” is central to the opuscula and, anticipating the results of my analysis, I can say that being in a significant position of the spiritual and meditative path delineated by the text, it constitutes its structural core. Such a placement finds meaning and justification within the philosophical, theological and apocalyptical reflections of the author.23 For Olieu, inwardness and outer activity, although remaining distinct, are balanceable and organizable in a reassemblage founded on devotio. We can say that the devotion of the reader, confirmed and strengthened by the inner experience of his personal reflection on mercy, is the element which allows this reassembling. We will see in what sense we can speak about an element of fracture and an entirely new forma mentis, which opens the way to modern secular spirituality.2. Inner Experience and the Structure of the opusculaI begin with the text entitled Informatio ad virtutum opera. This could be considered the manifesto text of the opuscula, because in this work Pierre de Jean Olieu clarifies the principle subject of the meditations offered to the reader, and proposes a stylistic, structural model which is respected, more or less precisely, in all the other texts of the corpus. This structure is very simple: the author lists twenty-eight subjects which the reader is invited to reflect upon during his personal endeavor towards virtuous perfection. The text is divided in two parts: the first presents fourteen orderly reflections centered on pedagogical-moral subjects like the meditation on God and the Passion of Christ, on the example of the Saints, the awareness of one’s sins, and on the coming of the Day of Judgement; in the second, the author.. (shrink)

Karl Smit se obicno smatra teoreticarem totalne drzave, totalnog rata i totalnog neprijateljstva. U clanku, medjutim, autor pokusava da pokaze da je od 1937. do 1944, Smit upozoravao na to da su totalni rat i totalno neprijateljstvo opasni po Nemacku i da se mora zaustaviti perpeturanje svih napora za totalizacijom neprijatelja, koji su zapoceli 1914. U svojim teorijskim radovima iz ovog perioda on je nalazio mesta samo za totalnu drzavu - a pogotovo za onu koja je dovoljno jaka da se (...) odupre iskusenju da objavi totalni rat totalnom neprijatelju. Totalna drzava koju je preporucivao Hitleru i njegovim nacionalsocijalistickim sledbenicima bio je nemacki Rajh, kao deo Evrope uredjenje i podeljene izmedju velikih prostora. Pozicionirana u sredini Evrope, izmedju ostalih sila Nemacka je trebalo da bude dovoljno pazljiva da ratuje samo protiv istocnih neprijatelja i samo za 'pravedne' granice. Zaokruzujuci na taj nacin svoj veliki prostor, Nemacka je trebalo da se okrene zadatku eksploatacije razlicitih naroda, kao sto su Poljaci, Cesi i Slovaci, koji su bili proglaseni kao nesposobni da imaju vlastitu drzavu i osudjeni na to da sluze gospodarsku rasu - Nemce. (shrink)

Analysis and exegesis attempting to isolate the distinctive uses Bonaventure makes of “ad Deum,” “in Deo,” and “in Deum.” While by itself this exegesis may bear little on Bonaventurean studies, applying it to his theology, especially his Christology, may prove quite useful in understanding humanity’s relationship to Christ. Applied to philosophy, the distinction between the passage toward God and into God, since it does involve emanation and conception of the Trinity, may help shed further light, not just on St. Bonaventure’s (...) mystical account of our journey into God, but of his general epistemology and account of illumination. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Rome's Religious History: Livy, Tacitus and Ammianus on Their GodsHans-Friedrich MuellerJason P. Davies. Rome's Religious History: Livy, Tacitus and Ammianus on Their Gods. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. x + 341 pp. Cloth, $85.Did the Romans believe in their gods? This question, Davies argues, has too long dominated scholarship on Roman religion, and his challenging book eschews this question (along with its dichotomous counterpart: skepticism), aiming instead to (...) engage vigorously more recent scholarship on Roman religion. Davies has read Livy, Tacitus, and Ammianus Marcellinus with sensitive attention to expressions of general religious sentiment and categories, and he has placed his findings squarely in the context of current historiographical analyses of Roman religion's literary functions. Davies sums up nicely: "What we seek here is the nature of the complex cognitive relationship between historiography and religion" (12). Generally excluded from the conversation are scholars who are deceased and who do not write in English. More rigorously excluded are cross-references to ancient authors beyond Davies' chosen three (although they do creep in from time to time, one will not come to this book for Cicero, Caesar, Sallust, Valerius Maximus, Velleius Paterculus, Suetonius, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Plutarch, et al.). Instead, Davies attempts by well-enunciated and conscious choice to conduct a series of experiments: he reads each of his chosen authors in isolation in order to build a coherent and consistent picture of the religious system of each in close conversation with the last two decades' debates on what Roman religion was really about.Although I shall in due course address my own reservations about his methodology, I would argue that we may applaud Davies for his experimental daring. The progress of knowledge requires room for failures as well as successes. We learn from both, and Davies brings before us three separate experiments: two chapters on Livy and one each on Tacitus and Ammianus. Starting from the premise that for the Romans the gods existed, and that Roman society's basic intellectual framework was "Roman religion" (whatever this may have meant to its many and varied practitioners over the course of the centuries preceding Livy), Davies' fresh readings describe what this religion appears to have entailed for each of his chosen authors. Each of those readings yields an instance or "moment" in the history of the religions of Rome and, as such, is a contribution to "Rome's religious history" (thus fulfilling, to this extent, the promise of the volume's title).After a general introduction outlining this methodology (chap. 1), Davies devotes the next two chapters to Livy (chap. 2: "Livy and the Invention of Roman Religion" and chap. 3: "Gods and Men in Livy"). We find, as we would expect, some discussion of Papirius Cursor, who in 293 B.C.E. arose in the third watch of the night to solicit the requisite impetrative auspicium before engaging the Samnites in battle (Livy 10.40.2). Papirius consulted a keeper of the sacred chickens, who announced a tripudium solistimum, despite the fact that the chickens would not eat (10.40.4). On the basis of this false report, Papirius declares that the auspicium [End Page 313] is excellent (egregium), and he orders the troops to prepare for battle (10.40.5). Papirius' nephew, however, learns from some of the cavalry who had overheard an argument among the pullarii that the pullarius' report was suspect, and he dutifully informs his uncle (10.40.9–10). Livy describes the youth as a "iuuenis ante doctrinam deos spernentem natus" (10.40.10). Papirius subsequently commends the youth but commences battle (ultimately victorious) on the grounds that the report he had requested and received itself constituted the auspicium, regardless of these other circumstances, and that any consequences for mendacity would be borne by the liar (10.40.11). The keepers of the sacred chickens are ordered to the front line, and the guilty pullarius is struck, and mortally wounded, by a javelin (10.40.12–13). This the consul interprets in turn as confirmation of his own interpretation of the auspicium as well as expiation of wrongdoing by the guilty party; the consul's statement to this effect... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:American Journal of Philology 121.4 (2000) 571-591 [Access article in PDF] The Aeneid Revisited: The Journey of Pompey in Lucan's Pharsalia Andreola Rossi Andromaque, je pense à vous! Ce petit fleuve, Pauvre et triste miroir où jadis resplendit L'immense majesté de vos douleurs de veuve, Ce Simoïs menteur qui par vos pleurs grandit, A fécondé soudain ma mémoire fertile, Comme je traversais le nouveau Carrousel. Le vieux Paris n'est (...) plus (la forme d'une ville Change plus vite, hélas! que le coeur d'un mortel) --Baudelaire, "Le Cygne" THE AENEID MAY BE DEFINED, among many other things, as the tale of a journey from the East to the West that becomes, at the same time, a journey from capitulation to foundation. 1 This idea is well summarized in the structure of the proem of the poem: Arma uirumque cano, Troiae qui primus ab oris Italiam fato profugus Lauiniaque uenit litora, multum ille et terris iactatus et alto ui superum, saeuae memorem Iunonis ob iram, multa quoque et bello passus, dum conderet urbem inferretque deos Latio; genus unde Latinum Albanique patres atque altae moenia Romae. (Virg. Aen. 1.1-7) I sing of arms and of a man: his fate had made him fugitive; he was the first to journey from the coasts of Troy as far as Italy and the Lavinian shores. Across the lands and waters he was battered beneath the violence of High Ones, for the savage Juno's unforgetting anger; [End Page 571] and many sufferings were his in war-- until he brought a city into being and carried in his gods to Latium; from this have come the Latin race, the lords of Alba, and the ramparts of high Rome. 2Troy, the point of departure for this journey, is in a conspicuous position in the opening hexameter of the proem; the city of Rome, the point of arrival, brings the proem to its closure. True enough, the foundation of the city of Rome lies outside the primary temporal setting of the poem. Its foundation, nevertheless, is anticipated in the various external prolepses that bring the narration beyond the limit of the temporal field of the first narrative. 3 Moreover, in the poem, Aeneas himself will be the founder of a new set of moenia in Latium, starting the process of city foundation that will culminate in the construction of the ramparts of high Rome. That Virgil's Aeneid is in its basic structure a poem of journey and foundation did not go unnoticed by the long line of his literary successors. As Hardie (1993, xi) has shown, Virgil's successors were all sharp and informed readers of the Aeneid, and their epic works should be read and interpreted as a creative rewriting and continuation, at once respectful and at times rebellious, of the Aeneid. Following this line of interpretation, I will argue that Lucan's Pharsalia, the so-called anti-Aeneid, 4 presents itself in the journey of Pompey as a critical, almost antiphrastic revisitation of Aeneas' journey. 5 The stages of Pompey's journey retrace some crucial stages of Aeneas' in the Aeneid, both [End Page 572] thematically and geographically. But Pompey's journey is "reversed"; it is turned "upside down." 6 It moves symmetrically backward, bringing the journey of the Aeneid back to its point of departure: from the West back to the East, from Rome back to Troy.In a comprehensive work on Lucan's Pharsalia, Ahl points out that among the many characters of the Pharsalia, Pompey is the one most closely modeled on Aeneas. 7 The first appearance of Pompey in the poem is symptomatic. At the beginning of the Pharsalia, Pompey is compared to an oak tree (like Aeneas in Aeneid 4). 8 But unlike Aeneas' firmly rooted mature tree, Pompey's tree is decayed and rootless. 9 Aeneas' roots are established in the very bowels of the earth, unshakable and immovable, and allow him to withstand the storm (Aen. 4.445- 46, ipsa haeret scopulis et quantum uertice ad auras / aetherias... (shrink)

U ovom tekstu pokusacu da protumacim promene kod Nea, glavnog lika trilogije Matriks, na zaledju Platonovih i Dekartovih ideja, kao i Hegelovih iz Filozofije istorije i Fenomenologije duha. Iako?filozofski?, Matriks nije razvucen niti dosadan film: umesto da beskrajno pricaju, likovi neprestano rade i taj ih rad menja. Suprotno rasirenom misljenju, ova interpretacija ne nalazi Dekartovu radikalnu sumnju u prvom delu trilogije, vec ga vidi kao dosledni platonizam. No, u njemu ima kartezijanskih motiva. Rezultat prvog dela jeste hegelovska nesretna svest. Sve (...) je to tek priprema za kljucni momenat cele trilogije, tj. dijalog Nea i Arhitekte. Neova odluka da odabere spas Triniti protumacena je u Hegelovim kategorijama beskonacnog prava subjekta da zadovolji sebe u onom sto radi; zbog toga je sesti Neo nov. Nakon pokazivanja razlika u ciljevima Nea i Agenta Smita, kao i preobrazaja ciljeva ljudi, treci deo teksta bavi se samim krajem Matriks revolucija i analizira ga koristeci Marksove ideje, s referencama na Platona i Nicea. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Vatican Manuscript of Spinoza’s EthicaSteven NadlerLeen Spruit and Pina Totaro. The Vatican Manuscript of Spinoza’s Ethica. Brill’s Studies in Intellectual History, 205. Brill’s Texts and Sources in Intellectual History, 11. Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2011. Pp. vi + 318. Cloth, $136.00.By any measure, it is a remarkable find. There was a small codex in the Vatican Library, marked Vat. Lat. 12838. It originally belonged to the Congregation of the (...) Holy Office, which in 1917 inherited the role of keeper of the Index of Prohibited Books. The codex had been transferred to the Library with other materials in 1922. The manuscript, originally acquired in 1677, bore no author’s name. According to the card catalogue it is a Tractatus theologiae, a five-part “Theological Treatise.” Its contents are described as follows: Pars prima de Deo: Definitiones. / 1. Per causam. / Des. Tam difficilia quam rara sunt.Sound familiar?We possess no autograph manuscripts of Spinoza’s philosophical writings (there are a couple of autographs of his letters). And the only philosophical manuscripts we do have are the two Dutch manuscripts of the Short Treatise on God, Man, and His Well-Being, both discovered in the nineteenth century but one of which almost certainly was composed in Spinoza’s lifetime from a Latin original. Thus, to discover a seventeenth-century Latin manuscript copy of the Ethics, even if it is not an autograph, is exciting news indeed. Since it was in the Vatican’s possession by September 1677, we know that it was written out while Spinoza (who had died only a few months earlier) was still alive; it may also be that, while the manuscript is not by Spinoza’s hand, he did look it over.What makes this last possibility even more likely is the fact that, as Leen Spruit and Pina Totaro—the discoverers of the manuscript—argue in their introduction to this volume, the manuscript may originally have belonged to a member of Spinoza’s circle of friends in Amsterdam, Walter Ehrefried von Tschirnhaus. Tschirnhaus was in Paris by 1676, and had in his possession a copy of the Ethics (which a suspicious Spinoza famously told him not to show to Leibniz, who was also in Paris at the time and wanted to have a look at the work). Tschirnhaus was in Rome within a year, where, Spruit and Totaro suggest, he may have made the acquaintance of Niels Stensen, erstwhile Lutheran scientist and friend of Spinoza, now a fervent Catholic convert and anti-Spinozist soon to be appointed Vicar Apostolic of Nordic Missions. Tschirnhaus, or possibly some other “Lutheran foreigner” (in Stensen’s words) to whom he, eager to spread the good word of Spinozism, had given the manuscript, passed it on to Stensen, who in turn handed it over to the Roman Inquisition, along with a denunciation of its author. Stensen’s intention was to have Spinoza condemned by the Church and his works placed on the Index. Spruit and Totaro also claim—on the basis of the handwriting—that the copyist of this manuscript is Pieter van Gent, a member of Spinoza’s circle who played a role in the posthumous publication of his works.While Spruit and Totaro wisely admit that this story behind the manuscript “cannot be established with certainty,” they also say that it is “rather likely.” Their plausible hypothetical reconstruction of the history of the manuscript and of its relationship to the publication history of the Ethics, as well as their account of other important contextual elements, is based on careful and informed scholarship, and makes for fascinating reading.As for the manuscript itself, it is not a revolutionary discovery (as, say, the discovery of the Short Treatise manuscripts were). It will not affect the reading of the Ethics in any major way. There are a variety of discrepancies between the Vatican manuscript and the text of the Ethics in the Opera Posthuma (OP) of 1678: differences in spelling, “rather insignificant” omissions and additions of words and phrases, probable scribal errors, changes in word order, and some noticeable differences in expression. To take just one nonetheless interesting example, the final clause of the... (shrink)

Tekst razmatra Rolsovu ideju javnog uma kao sredisnji deo njegove koncepcije politickog liberalizma. Ideja javnog uma je shvacena dvostruko, kao norma opravdanja i kao politicki ideal. U tekstu su takodje razmotrene neke kritike Rolsove koncepcije i naznaceni moguci nacini na koji se Rols moze odbraniti od njih. Osnovne teze u tekstu su da se Rolsova koncepcija javnog uma moze odbraniti od standardnih kritika, ali i da sama razotkriva ogranicenja politickog ideala liberalne demokratije. Dosledno shvacen, politicki ideal liberalne demokratije mora se (...) odreci pretenzija na moralnu superiornost i oslanjati se na moralni konsenzus koji moze biti potvrdjen javnim umom politickog drustva.. (shrink)

In this article, based on the most important William of Ockham’s O. Min. writings, we analyze his ideias concerning the origins of the imperial and secular power. Founded in the Paul’s doctrine omnis potestas a Deo, but enlarged, per homines, and also on the ideas of his Franciscan brothers which lived before, which articulated the concepts of proprietas and domininum, in order to explain the human origins of the both, on the one hand, Ockham refuses not only the hierocratic theory, (...) but also Marsilius of Padua thought about this subject, and, on the other hand, he offers his contribution for this subject, according with which, nor the Empire neither the Estates are completely subordinated to the Church, nor the Church is subordinated for the secular power, because, referring its origins, both, Church and Estates are different origins, the first has a divine proceeding, the others, are immediately a human provenance and, because, in its specific spheres of action the spiritual power and the secular power do not depend one of the other and vice versa.Neste artigo, fundamentado nos principais escritos de Guilherme de Ockham, O. Min., analisamos sua concepção a respeito das origens dos poderes imperial e secular. Ancorado no versículo paulino omnis potestas a Deo, mas ampliado, sed per homines e, igualmente, nas ideias dos confrades que o antecederam, os quais relacionaram entre si os conceitos proprietas e dominium, com vista a explicar as origens humanas dos mesmos, de um lado, ele rebate tanto a teoria hierocrata quanto a de Marsílio de Pádua, relativas ao tema em exame e, de outro, oferece sua contribuição ao mesmo, mediante a qual, nem o Império nem os Estados estão completamente subordinados à Igreja, nem esta está submissa ao poder terreno, porque, quanto às origens de ambos, a Igreja tem uma procedência divina e os Estados e o Império têm imediatamente uma origem humana e, ainda, porque nas esferas respectivas de atuação, os poderes espiritual e secular independem um do outro. (shrink)

L'A. pubblica una quaestio di Gilberto di Stratton, contenuta nel ms. Assisi, Bibl. Comunale, 158 dal titolo Utrum aliquod eviternum potuit fuisse Deo coeternum che, a suo avviso, rappresenta forse il primo esempio di difesa della posizione assunta da Tommaso all'interno del dibattito de aeterniate mundi, posizione che, come è noto, fu oggetto di condanna nel 1277 . Nella breve introd. che precede il testo, l'A. sottolinea il fatto che Gilberto oltre a riprendere e ad assumere la posizione di Tommaso, (...) ed in particolare quella della non contradditorietà tra l'esse factum e l'esse aeternum, mostra di conoscere le critiche che aveva mosso Bonaventura al Doctor angelicus e gli argomenti ex infinito formulati dal maestro francescano per dimostrare l'inizio temporale del mondo. Di Gilberto esiste un'altra quaestio contenuta nello stesso ms. e che sembra una versione alterata del De aeternitate di Tommaso e che l'A. ha pubblicato con O. Argerami in Leiden 1993. (shrink)

The paper displays the religious and theological foundations, which initiated the reformation process with the help of nowadays popular markers known as 5 Sola of Reformation. It demonstrates the main theological principles which identify Protestantism among other religious groups. But simultaneously the hermeneutics of these principles divides Protestantism into many currents, which forms this religious movement heterogeneity. The main focus of the article lays on the comparative description of each of five features of the theological system of Reformed theology in (...) the understanding of masters and radical reformation. The history of formation of 5 Sola and its theological meaning are analyzed as well. The paper's main interest is focused on the basic formal principle of all the Protestant movement - Sola Scriptura. The author of the article describes the Postmodern society challenges faced by this principle, he demonstrates what it does and what it does not mean in contemporary Evangelical movement. The meaning of Sola gratia as a formation point of Lutheran theological system is exposed, a different understanding of faith and interpretation of the principle of Sola fide in magisterial and radical Protestantism is exposed, the peculiarities of application of the principles of Solus Christus and Soli Deo Gloria in Eastern and Western Christian traditions. (shrink)

Puente Hurtado de Mendoza (1578–1641), Iberian Jesuit and author of one of the earliest comprehensive Baroque philosophy courses, entered the debate on the modality “moral” or “morally” in the sense of a qualifier of evidence, certainty, being, and necessity or impossibility in the first half of the seventeenth century. This paper presents his analysis of the different forms (or levels) of evidence and necessity or impossibility in 1630s, where “moral” represents the weakest degree of these properties. First, it covers the (...) notion of moral evidence in the sense of a wise decision that is in accordance with the consensus of either the majority of mankind or of the learned community, as introduced in Disputationes de Deo. Second, it covers the notions of moral necessity and impossibility, introduced in De Deo homine in terms of a strong inclination, and developed in Hurtado’s later theological texts. Third, Hurtado introduced the notion “morally” in his De actibus humanis in frequentist terms. (shrink)

This text is part of a research conducted under the working title "What do we talk about when we are silent and what are we silent about when we are talking? - premises for the anthropology of silence about the nearest past." In the first part the author investigates the meaning of silence in the Croatian and Serbian press right before and during Croatia's Operation Storm. The ratio between silence, suppression of information and forgetting, on the one hand, and social (...) memory, on the other, has been elaborated in the final part of the text by following reports about the anniversaries of Operation Storm in both Croatian and Serbian publics. The starting point lies in the belief that the phenomenon of silence, being an immanent part of each discourse, represents an important factor in the creation of social relationships and system of value models, that it has important communication and cognitive functions and that the performance character lies in its essence. In short, silence makes it possible to form the prevailing image about this event, even if it does not construct it indirectly - through speech. The author has elaborated on the meaning of silence in the context of Operation Storm partly because studies about the breakup of Yugoslavia frequently mention silence as a manipulation strategy employed by some of the sides in the conflict, while not a single study systematically investigates the semantic of silence and suppression of information in these conflicts. Most importantly, taking into account the frequency of direct silence in the newspaper discourse and rhetoric strategies that point at silence indirectly from the context and discourse, the author focuses on the relationship between the event and silence. In order to shed light on the way in which Operation Storm is remembered, i.e. forgotten, in the stakeholders' publics and political imageries, she follows the dailies - Vecernje Novosti Politika, Danas - Vecernji List, Jutarnji List, Magazin supplement of the Jutarnji List, as well as texts about Operation Storm in weeklies such as the NIN and Vreme of Belgrade or Globus of Zagreb in the period between August 2, 1995 and mid-August 2006. Ovaj tekst je deo istrazivanja koje se odvija pod radnim naslovom "O cemu govorimo kada cutimo i o cemu cutimo kada govorimo? - polazne pretpostavke za antropologiju cutanja o najbilizoj proslosti". U prvom delu autorka ispituje znacenja cutanja u pisanju hrvatske i srpske stampe neposredno pre hrvatske akcije Oluja i tokom same akcije. Odnos cutanja, precutkivanja i zaboravljanja, s jedne strane, i drustvenog pamcenja, s druge strane tematizovan je u zavrsnom delu teksta, pracenjem napisa o godisnjicama akcije Oluja u obe javnosti - hrvatskoj i srpskoj. Polaziste je u uverenju da je fenomen cutanja, buduci imanentni deo svakog diskursa znacajan cinilac kreiranja drustvenih odnosa i sistema vrednosnih modela, da ima vazne komunikativne i kognitivne funkcije i da je u svojoj sustini performativnog karaktera. U najkracem, cutanje pomaze formiranju dominantne slike o ovom dogadjaju, ako je, na posredan nacin - preko govorenja - i ne konstruise. Tematizovanje znacenja cutanja u kontekstu akcije Oluja preduzeto je delom i stoga sto se precutkivanje u studijama o kraju Jugoslavije neretko pominje kao manipulativna strategija neke od strana u sukobu, a da nema ni jedne studije koja bi sistematski ispitivala znacenja cutanja i precutkivanja u ovim konfliktima. I najvaznije, uvazavajuci frekventnost neposrednog izrazavanja cutanja u novinskom diskursu, kao i retorickih strategija koje posredno, iz konteksta i uspostavljenog sveta diskursa, upucuju na cutanje, autorka se usredsredjuje upravo na odnos dogadjajnosti i cutanja. Kako bi osvetlila nacin na koji je operacija Oluja zapamcena, odnosno zaboravljena u zainteresovanim javnostima i politickim imginarijumima, prati pisanje dnevne stampe - Vecernje novosti, Politika, Danas - Vecernji list Jutarnji list, Magazin - dodatak Jutarnjeg lista, kao i napise o Oluji u nedeljnicima, poput beogradskog NIN-a, Vremena ili zagrebackog Globusa u periodu od 02. avgusta 1995. do sredine avgusta 2006. godine. (shrink)

Fihteova teorija drzave, koja cini integralni deo njegove prakticke filozofije, izgradjena je na kljucnim postavkama njegove metafizike. Stoga, osvetljavanje ovog problema u Fihteovoj poznoj filozofiji treba da podseti s jedne strane na jedan reprezentativan metafizicki projekat drzave velike spekulativne snage, a s druge strane na jedan nacin misljenja o drzavi koji se danas smatra anahronim, nenaucnim, prevazidjenim, te stoga vrednim da bude pominjan kao "negativan primer". Iako pomenute kvalifikacije ne treba sasvim odbaciti ili ih pak, unapred dovesti u pitanje, ipak (...) vracanje Fihteovoj poznoj metafizici drzave ne moze ni u nasem vremenu biti filozofski neproduktivno. Ono danas moze biti od sustinske pomoci svakome ko jos nije pregazen pohodom scjentisticke politologije, svakome ciji je saznajni interes jos uvek dovoljno otvoren za izrazito filozofsko razmatranje drzave, svakome ko zeli da filozofski obogati ili izostri pogled na drzavu. Iako je Fihteova teorija drzave jedinstvena i koherentna, ona je, narocito u svojoj poslednjoj fazi dozivela znacajan preobrazaj. Taj preobrazaj je bio toliko vidljiv da se drzava i u terminoloskom smislu pomera u pozadinu. U Fihteovoj poznoj filozofiji kljucna rec nije vise drzava, vec "carstvo slobode". O drzavi se sada govori, takoreci, intencionalno, svagda s pogledom na to carstvo, na mogucnost i izglede njegovog uspostavljanja. Bez obzira sto je ovaj terminoloski i saznajni primat carstva slobode potisnuo drzavu u drugi plan, on joj, ipak, nije porekao svaki znacaj. Naprotiv. Na putu ka carstvu slobode drzava za Fihtea predstavlja vaznu tacku razvoja preko koje se mora proci. Bas u toj njenoj prolaznosti lezi njena nezaobilaznost. (shrink)

FRANCIS SUÁREZ’S VIEWS ON THE RELATION BETWEEN THE ABSOLUTE POWER OF GOD AND THE NATURAL LAW The article presents Francis Suárez’s views concerning the problem of the possibility of granting dispensation from the natural law by the absolute power of God. Suárez’s opinions on this matter were shown in his comprehensive work on the philosophy of law: De legibus ac Deo legislatore, in Book II De lege aeterna, naturali, et jure gentium, chapter XV entitled Utrum Deus dispensare possit in lege (...) naturali etiam de absoluta potestate. Analyzing the notion of natural law Suárez accepts the Thomistic formula, according to which, the created world is a collection of things with invariable natures. These natures require us to fulfil certain moral obligations and to act in a proper manner. And for this reason, natural law, included in the Decalogue, is invariable and even God is not able to grant its dispensation. The commandments involve an intrinsic principle of justice and obligation and for this reason they are not liable to dispensation. God cannot act contrary to His own nature and His being just, so He would not order people to do something intrinsically unjust. Doctor Eximius justifies moral norms expressed in the Decalogue axiologically, not in a voluntaristic way, by referring to God’s will alone. Suárez criticises both strong theological voluntarism, attributed to Ockham, as well as weak theological voluntarism, attributed to John Duns Scotus. Keywords: FRANCIS SUÁREZ, ABSOLUTE POWER OF GOD, NATURAL LAW. (shrink)

Krizu moderne kao krizu politickog, autor vidi, pre svega kao krizu "mere" kriterija politickog odlucivanja i delovanja. Ta kriza se u prvom redu shvata kao kriza samosaznanja i prakse obicajnosti. Ovaj problem prvi je pokusao je da resi Makijaveli uvodeci pojam virtus, koji je postao temeljni princip moderne politicke filozofije. Medjutim, mnogi moderni i savremeni tumaci Makijavelijevog ucenja cesto zanemaruju socijalni i politicki konteksta u kojem je nastalo politicko ucenje Firentinskog mislioca. Naime, Makijavelijevo nastojanje da pronadje autenticnu formu politickog cina (...) kojim bi bila omogucena harmonizacija i stabilizacija tadasnjih dramaticnih politickih prilika koje su vladale u italijanskim gradovima, zahtevala je pouzdanu dijagnozu i adekvatna sredstva za uspesnu terapiju obolelog organizma zajednice. Epohalni novum u Makijavelijevoj politickoj teoriji predstavlja prelazak sa anticke teoretizacije vrline na njenu modernu operacionalizaciju. Medjutim, ova promena cesto se tumaci kao radikalno suprotstavljanje grckog pojma arete i rimske virtus, koja se grubo svodi samo na srcanosot i snagu koje su neophodne za osvajanje i ocuvanje politicke vlasti. Vazan deo puta u svojoj filozofiji politike Hegel - vise nesvesno nego svesno - ide s Makijavelijem i Selingom - posebno kad je u pitanju shvatanje neophodnosti snage i srcanosti u procesu operacionalizacije duha slobode u istoriji posredstvom "negacije" kao "moci zla". Posredovanje subjektivnosti i supstancijaliteta zbiva se, po Hegelu, u drzavi surovim krocenjem svetskog duha u kojem on zrtvuje ne samo pojedinca, vec i citave narode - prema slobodi, odnosno njenom ostvarenju u obicajnosnoj zajednici. "Nevolja vremena" posledica je razdvajanja ja i sveta (Entzweiung), i proistice iz redukovanog politickog uma koji za politicko delovanje i odlucivanje nema kriterijuma obicajnosnog totaliteta. Ovaj se um rutinizira razdvajanjem obicajnosti koja redukuje politicko delanje na ogoljenu tehniku osvajanja i zadrzavanja politicke moci. Autor na kraju razmatra krizu politickog odlucivanja i ukazuje u cemu je njen globalni i supstancijalni smisao za povesnu stvarnost na kraju XX veka. (shrink)

In this article I explain various points of contact between Newman and the Catholic philosophical tradition. I begin with Newman’s personalism as it is found in the Grammar of Assent, especially in the distinction between notional and real assent, and in the distinction between formal and informal inference. Then I proceed to Newman’s personalism as it is found in his teaching on conscience and on doctrinal development. I then consider Newman as proto-phenomenologist and also as an Augustinian thinker. Finally, I (...) discuss Newman’s teaching on moral and intellectual virtue in The Idea of a University. If I had to pick one utterance of Newman that epitomizes his philosophical thought in a way that engages Catholic philosophers, I would pick the motto of the Grammar of Assent: “Non in dialectica complacuit Deo salvum facere populum tuum.”. (shrink)

This article explores the phenomenology of time and eschatology in the thought of Jean-Yves Lacoste, including his recent book on the philosophy of history. Lacoste’s idea of “the hidden present” is examined within the context of his broader theological and philosophical framework, with a particular focus on the way it addresses the intersection of temporality and eternity. Human temporality is characterized by finitude and death, which are interpreted both philosophically—under the influence of Heidegger’s philosophy—and theologically. Using Husserlian and Heideggerian concepts, (...) Lacoste proposes a theologically inspired conceptual network: phenomenological reduction versus theological reduction, world versus creation, death versus resurrection, care (Sorge) versus eschatological restlessness, and time versus eschaton. All of these describe the liturgical experience of man before God and the possibility of an eternity which, from the point of view of the world and of our experience in the world, can only take on the ever-provisional figure of anticipation. The present article argues for the existence of a theological paradox of eschatology in the writings of the French phenomenologist: even if eschatology is only anticipated, the liturgical man, situated before God (coram Deo), experiences it in an incomplete and apophatic manner. (shrink)

Prilog ispituje pretpostavku o univerzalnosti metafore i njenu ulogu u diksursu filozofije i nauke. U prvom delu istrazuje se teza o metafori kao?sveproz?imajuc?em sredstvu? i njen uticaj na metadiskurs o filozofiji i nauci u prilozima nekih savremenih epistemologa nauke i filozofije jezika. Cilj rasprave je, s jedne strane, pokazati da se univerzalizacija metafore uglavnom vise odvija kao precutna zamena metafora modelima i analogijama nego kao razrada pretpostavljene konstitutivne uloge genuinih metafora u racionalnom diskursu. Na toj osnovi se u drugom i (...) trecem delu pokusavaju pruziti argumenti za lociranje tradicionalno prepostavljene?iracionalnosti? metafora da bi se iznova promislila vaznost razlike izmedju doslovnosti temeljnih jezickih funkcija s jedne strane i emfaticnih iskaza sadrzanih u metaforickim izrazima s druge strane. Time se sugerise drugaciji model vrednovanja metafora kao univerzalnih, legitimnih i epistemicki inovativnih u racionalnom diskursu filozofije i nauke. Ovakvo gledanje na metafore dopusta da se verovanje u univerzalni karakter prenosa u jeziku i misljenju temelji u univerzalnosti jezicnih funkcija, a ne u posebnosti metafore kao forme izricaja, a da se pri tome metafore i dalje smatraju onim sto zapravo jesu: posebni i ujedno karakteristicni deo jezika bez kojeg nikakav uvid u diferencijalni i materijalni karakter jezika ne bi bio moguc. (shrink)